

COLE'S NOTES

~~Cuba~~ II

Questions

1. unlabeled tempting target (depends on expectation of US response:
 ion Berlin. Possibility of defending Hank,
 2. Potential for escalation resulting from existence of a relatively
 ineffective weapons system
 preventing a ↑ [no notion of "provocation"]
 should seek to avoid
3. Must expect SC crises; deny SC an opportunity to bring political
 pressure to bear by threatening attacks [not in Cuba] against highly vulnerable
 weapons of limited value.
4. Turkish manning
5. Who controls hordes for 104's? What good to Turks without hordes?
 Why are they better? Interpreted to Turks as "conventional"?
- [detached from letter to study]
6. Polaris less "exposed" to limited attack in a crisis
 (Such attack would have gravest consequences — [Doesn't this
 reduce temptation? Should we reply to Allies that we would
 be tempted in SC position?] since it would require an
 immediate response with appropriate countermeasures.
- in effect,
7. [What are we telling Turks about the "tempting" nature of
 Note: no longer SC fear of Turkish — unmentioned — use
 their other capabilities? about US response? Might we regard
 SC attack as "reasonable"? What limited til- for-at would we accept

Reasons for desiring removal (since April 1961: Risk to ^{Johnson} ~~do~~ ^{do})

a) Vulnerability, provocation, accident, unauthorized action, accident under attack

b) (Noticed in Cuban crisis: vulnerability to ^{coercion?} pressure in crisis or, 'OS "temptation"')

But note: in Cuba, "pressure" was a) Allies, UK, US public;

b) SU complaint, offer to trade (i.e. ^{US} ~~US~~ had something - Turkish missiles - ^{SO} they were willing to accept in trade)

c) We found SU attack - but did they threaten? Would they have threatened? Would they have carried out?

[In Dec., JFK said he wanted missiles out "as soon as possible" - not not be around in next crisis. McN said convinced that deadlines are messy; he set deadline of 1 April. Decision flat; others had no real chance to influence it.]

What looks to avoid? What looks can hurt? How?
What misinterpretations? Replies?

Note: foregoing any rewards of "unilateral initiative,"
"reducing tension" (because of negative payoffs w.r.t.
Alliance: except in UK). Foregoing SU trades: e.g. reduced
threat to Turkey, etc. (And avoiding SU "inspiration," or
apparent reliance on SU promises, esp. uninspected.)

Rules of engagement for SACEUR Polaris?
Permissive link?

Official, private, statement of why we want missiles out?

How about "pressure" on Turkish "sub ports" (note proposed
visits) as ^{counter} ~~counter~~ to US pressure against SU sub ports or
visits in Cuba?

Or on US needs in Turkey? Why are these improvements?
(What about our position on Migs in Cuba? Or II-28's?)

{ Are we going to follow assumption that all asymmetries of practice or posture in favor of US are

- 2) unreasonable, unqualified, untenable
- b) vulnerabilities in US political position, "exposed" & "tempting" targets for threats or embarrassing offers?

[They would be if US strategy depend on appeals to symmetry, to reasonableness; appeals to SU to "even the balance," "play fair"].

③ [Why hasn't SU been able to threaten attack on Turkish missiles effectively in fact, as US did in Cuba? Is their local superiority there less than that of US in Cuba?

If fear of US strategic power: Has this balance changed?
Or: is it not enough in general, when we are pressing them? Berlin?
That much? ~~What does that~~ [Is it now US theory that —

due to strategic "stalemate" — it is now threat of local attack that counts, hence local superiority? Are we prepared to draw global implications of that? Is it true? Or was it fear of US strategic superiority that was effective in Cuba and would deter SU in Turkey?

Vulnerability + slow reaction time make poplite a standing temptation for an enemy first strike, nuclear or conventional.

[Are weapons protected by their own capability to respond to attack?]

~~Dangers to NATO posture~~

[Did we officially reject SU comparison of Cuba to Turkey?]

[What is basis for assurance that SU will not interpret our withdrawal as change in US willingness to strike first? Is there SYIE? As change in nuclear weapons policy in Europe?

Dangers to NATO posture and to world peace of existence of ^{like} absolvent systems within range of SU conventional forces.

[How about SU MRBM's?]

[Do we anticipate

We naturally were forced to consider that SU might be tempted to strike at Turkish pipiters.

[Why? What basis, in int?]

(Instructions to Hare)

Should this have occurred, we would have been forced to respond with adequate countermeasures, and entire world would have been in imminent danger escalation to thermonuclear exchange which was not desired by either side.

[Why danger, then? Do we want to support Allies' belief that approp. counter to attack on Turkish missiles would raise danger of TN war — over what SU attack raised it to? And would not SU see "necessity" for US counter? Why would it attack, then?]

How will this fit into Allied domestic politics?

(compare Skybolt) How will it find reaction to Skybolt in UK, Paris, FRG? [V-bombers?]

What measures proposed to counter bad impressions?

[Japetus are part of NATO-committed forces of Italy + Turkey;

they should raise changes in NAC; but are disinclined to do so.

[What do they gain?] so, active effort to induce them.

If they press US to make it, reduces impression of voluntary cooperative

effort. [What if they back — or threaten, to wit?]

[earlier notion: earmarked for assignment to SACFOR, like Sixth Fleet?] (changed para 4)

[See talking paper for Crooks. US/4 paper]

Khin?